Zombies! Zombies!

[reddragdiva]

The p-zombie theory holds that being able to conceive of something makes it possible; and because p-zombies are possible, therefore dualism or something very like it. That is: proponents hold that because they can imagine p-zombies, therefore such a thing is possible.

(I'm not going to explain it further than linking to Wikipedia. But trust me when I say there are people who actually take the idea seriously.)

The tricky bit appears to be "conceive of" in a sense that implies possibility. Consider these statements:

1. I can conceive of 2+2=4 being true (in conventional everyday Peano arithmetic as we commonly know it).
2. I can conceive of 2+2=5 being true (in conventional Peano arithmetic).
3. I can conceive of P being equal to NP.
4. I can conceive of P not being equal to NP.
5. I can conceive of p-zombies, therefore dualism.
6. If I can conceive of p-zombies then dualism, which is a confused idea, therefore p-zombies is a confused idea by reductio ad absurdum.

With the second, I am claiming to "conceive of" something trivially false. I arguably haven't conceived of anything actually possible; I've just shuffled some words together.

With the third and fourth, I'm claiming to have conceived of something no-one knows (though many suspect 3 is false and 4 is true). To what extent have I actually thought it through? At some point I will hit a contradiction with one of them, though no-one has yet. Both are "conceivable" in some sense; certainly that the speaker has formed a sentence in their head that they can try out for its logical implications. But one of those statements is as wrong as 2+2=5 nevertheless. Thus, conceiving of something in this sense does not imply it can possibly be true.

When someone claims that p-zombies are a conceivable thing at all, and that they have conceived of them (first part of statement five), this doesn't actually say anything about the world or what is even possible; it just says they've formed a sentence in their head they think they can try out for its logical implications. Which is fine, but the world doesn't care what philosophers think they think.

Statement six is my own view. P-zombies is like creationism for smart people. The main argument for dualism remains its advocates really really wanting it to be true.

And now, a movie.

Comments

[vampwillow]

:: reads this ::

:: reads WP ::

burble ... murble ... burble ...

:: mind breaks ::

[reddragdiva]

When the concept was raised on LessWrong, people couldn't believe anyone took this shit seriously. But they do. (I've just realised that second post makes the exact same point I just did above.) The huge gap between "I don't see a contradiction yet" and "this is logically possible".

[arkady]

It's philosophical dick-waving. The best response I think is to sit back and chuck popcorn at them.

[holdthesky]

AIUI, the argument is along the lines of IF you consider p-zombies as plausible and distinct from regular folk, THEN you are a dualist, because that distinction is based on one which only exists in dualist conceptions of the world (to a non-dualist a strong p-zombie would just be a person as there is no special sauce either to be added or withheld. I think that's a reasonable argument (if flawed in conflating all non-physical conceptions of the world as dualist). I think it says nothing about what one ought to think about the validity of p-zombies, just the cinsequences of accepting their validity.

Sorry for typos, phone & s/w keyboard on bus not ideal for this kind of thing.

[reddragdiva]

That's Minsky's refutation. Advocates of the p-zombie theory tend to assert that they are conceivable therefore dualism, and do not consider their argument circular (though it totally is).

[reddragdiva]

I am pleased to note that the dualist sitting next to me also considers this argument obviously circular.

[holdthesky]

Indeed! Such folk sound loopy. I've talked about p-zombies eith folk (usually in the context of Star Trek transporters: rock 'n' roll) without having a clear position on their possibility.

[reddragdiva]

Philosophical argument on a bus by phone is completely acceptable street philosophy. "C'mon if you think yer robust enough."

[valkyriekaren]

Isn't that Anselm's ontological argument, just with zombies instead of God?

[reddragdiva]

Their use of "conceive" is pretty close to the ontological argument, yes.

There are meanings of "conceive" which do mean the thing is possible. "I have worked out how to program an artificial intelligence" would count as conception making the conceived-of thing possible, for example. "I have proved P is not NP" would count of conceiving of a world where P is not NP. That's rather more work than pushing some words together into a testable-looking sentence.

[(Anonymous)]

I think that you're a little confused here. While the p-zombie does often come up in discussions of dualism it is by no means the only place where it does come up and it is certainly disingenuous to state that someone who believes in the possibility of p-zombies necessarily believes in dualism or anything like it. You seem to have come at this discussion arse backwards -- some people who believe in dualism make arguments using p-zombies for sure. But that doesn't tell us anything about whether such things are possible.

[reddragdiva]

The assertion is, to be more precise, that the proponent being able to conceive of p-zombies means that physicalism is false. "Physicalism is false" is very much "anything like" dualism. It's still p-zombies therefore magic.

I'm speaking here strictly of the Chalmers formulation, not necessarily variants. Chalmers endorses panpsychism (a philosophical version of animism) rather than strict Cartesian dualism per se, but this is splitting hairs.

[andrewhickey.info]

"P-zombies is like creationism for smart people"

s/smart/educated . Anyone who takes the argument seriously for a nanosecond (in any of the presentations of said argument I've ever seen) is a moron. Knowing big words doesn't change that.

[tcpip]

Well, I guess I must be a moron then. What a sophisticated and reasoned argument you've presented.

[reddragdiva]

Are you subscribing to the Chalmers version or some variant?

[tcpip]

You're scratching about in on some well trodden territory.

P-zombies is like creationism for smart people. The main argument for dualism remains its advocates really really wanting it to be true.

Robotism is like creationism for smart people. The main argument for monism remains its advocates really really wanting it to be true.

See what I did there?

[reddragdiva]

Much as atheism is a religion. Hold on, it turns out you can't just swap words and get a true sentence.

[tcpip]

But the logic remains the same, which means your claim at this stage is as equally valid as mine.

Perhaps a better angle would be to disprove the content rather than engage in witticisms alone.

I find your propositions are littered with some pretty basic errors, which I'll take the opportunity to go through.

I'll start with a request for elaboration on points (1) and (2) as (3) and (4) are dependent on them. Remember that both have to remain true with each other.

Proposition (5) is somewhat incorrect. Philosophical zombies themselves do not verify dualism as such, rather they are a falsification of physicalism. This can be used to support any number of varieties dualism, but it is not a proof of dualism.

Proposition (6) is thoroughly incorrect. Asserting dualism is "confused", is unhelpful, especially when you haven't clarified which form of dualism.

Also, the phrase reductio ad absurdum doesn't mean what you seem to think it means. It doesn't mean that a proposition is incorrect because you, me or anyone else think the conclusions are absurd, but rather because they are logically absurd. Philosophical zombies have no logical absurdity about them.

Chalmers endorses panpsychism (a philosophical version of animism)

I would appreciate a citation for this. I am unfamiliar with Chalmers ever claiming that all objects have consciousness. At the very best you could claim that he advocates panprotoexperientialism, but then again, I suppose that we all do.

[reddragdiva]

Ah, he's sympathetic to panpsychism but "not committed" to the idea.

[tcpip]

No, that is not what he wrote. Here is what he wrote:

In my book on consciousness I discuss panpsychism fairly sympathetically...

Which of course he does; he discusses the possibility of all physical objects having consciousness with a fairly straight face in The Conscious Mind. Which of course, a good philosopher of consciousness should do.

[reddragdiva]

3 and 4 are not dependent on 1 and 2 - the six statements are related in pairs, but are separate statements, not a logical chain. Read again and see if it makes more sense.

I'm speaking loosely and using "dualism" to mean "not physicalism". I don't feel the ambiguity makes much practical difference.

[tcpip]

I'm speaking loosely and using "dualism" to mean "not physicalism". I
don't feel the ambiguity makes much practical difference.

It makes an enormous difference, especially given that "dualism" and "not physicalism" are not the same thing. There is, for example, several varieties of non-physicalist monism.

Perhaps you should explain what 'physicalism' means to you.